

A Zero-cost Approach to Detect Recycled SoC Chips Using Embedded SRAM

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Motivations



Impact of counterfeit ICs.

- The Government and Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) has seen a **six-fold increase** in reported counterfeit ICs since 2006.
- Information Handling Services Inc. (IHS) have pointed out that reports of counterfeit parts have increased by **25% every year** since 2001.
- Counterfeits result in substantial economic losses to the electronics industry, reportedly as high as hundreds of billions.
- Counterfeit parts decrease the overall system reliability.
- Manufactories lose reputation.

Current difficulties

- No one-size-fits-all solutions.
- Detection requires additional circuitries.











Detected by the techniques such as secure split-test (SST), electronic circuit ID (ECID), etc.















Major contributions

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Recycled IC detection

- First SRAM based approach
- Zero-cost

Aging-sensitive SRAM bit selection algorithm

- Based on SRAM power-up readings
- Under room temperature and high temperature

Parameter analysis

- ID length, threshold, etc.
- Low equal error rate

Measurements evaluation

- Four embedded SRAMs
- More than 10GB real data



SRAM Background



• Structure: popular 6-T SRAM (a)



(a) 6Ts COMS SRAM Cell



SRAM Background



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- Start-up behavior of SRAM cells varies due to process variations:
 - Non-skewed cells: candidates for SRAM TRNG
 - Fully-skewed cells: candidates for SRAM PUF
 - Partially-skewed cells: candidates for SRAM Counterfeit detection.



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Structure: popular 6-T SRAM (a) Start-up behavior of SRAM ce

SRAM Background

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• SRAM aging:

- Hot carrier injection (HCI)
- Bias temperature instability (BTI)
- Aging effects on partially-skewed cells: change the start-up values.



(a) 6Ts COMS SRAM Cell





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Proposed methodology



Enrollment phase Verification phase



Proposed methodology





ASBs: Ageing-Sensitive
SRAM Bits (*partially-skewed cells*).
Gap: Designer-defined
parameter.
ID: ASB locations.
Threshold: a value used
to determined recycled
IC.

Verification phase

Proposed methodology





ASBs: Ageing-Sensitive
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Threshold: a value used
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Score: a value generated by SRAM under test.

ASB qualification



• Ideal case: a SRAM cell's





ASB qualification



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• More general case: a SRAM cell's





ASB qualification



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- Gap
 - A value ranging from 0 to 1 representing this *probability change*.



Power up the SRAM for enrollment



New SRAM

"Aged" SRAM



ID is calculated with respect to **Gap** g









Bit locations (whole SRAM, K bits)

ID is calculated with respect to Gap g







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ID is calculated with respect to Gap g



Bit locations (whole SRAM, K bits)







Threshold calculation









Threshold calculation

1

ID





→ Before aging:
$$P_{1|RT}(k) \le \frac{1-g}{2}$$
 → expected number of '1's < $|Loc_1| \times \frac{1-g}{2}$



Threshold calculation







 Step 1: Load ID (consists of two independent parts Loc₀ and Loc₁).









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Predicted ID extracted from

- New SRAM → New SRAM in room temperature
- "Aged" SRAM → New SRAM in High/Low temperature
- **{1**, 4, 5, **12**, 15, **26**, 60, **78**, ... **}**







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True ID extracted from

- New SRAM → New SRAM in room temperature
- "Aged" SRAM → Aged SRAM in room temperature {1, 3, 6, 12, 26, 27, 31, 59, 78, ... }





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Overlapped locations {1,12,26,78, ... }

True ID extracted from

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- "Aged" SRAM → Aged SRAM in room temperature {1, 3, 6, 12, 26, 27, 31, 59, 78, ... }

Overlapped locations	Gap values					
Predicted ID	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	I
High temperature	18%	17%	14%	9%	14%	25%
Low temperature	12%	9%	7%	8%	7%	20%



Experiment Setup

- Platforms: 4 Spartan-3 FPGAs with 2 MB on-board SRAM
- Temperature corners: Low 0°C, Room 20°C, High 80°C.
- Voltage corners: 3.0V, 3.3V and 3.6V.
- 10 trials for each testing corner.
- Aging duration: 5 hours accelerated aging.





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Metrics

- False Accept Rate (FAR)
 - $FAR = \frac{\text{The number of trials which detect the aged SRAM as new}}{FAR}$
 - Total numbr of trails
- False Reject Rate (FRR)
 - $FRR = \frac{\text{The number of trials which detect the$ **new**SRAM as*aged* $}$
 - Total numbr of trails
- Equal Error Rate (*EER*)
 - $EER = \frac{FAR + FRR}{2}$
- ID length



Effect of different Gap values



Score distributions on different Gap values

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Area 1: Large error rates due to a small gap values. New and Aged SRAM scores heavily overlap.

SRAM #	EER	FAR
l	0.21	0.25
2	0.05	0.05
3	0.15	0.20
4	0.25	0.25



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Area 3 and **4**: Large gap values result in short IDs. One bit error leads to a large total error rate.

SRAM #	EER	FAR
	0.00	0.00
2	0.14	0.28
3	0.00	0.00
4	0.00	0.00





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-FAR_{Multiple} -FAR_{Single}--EER_{Single}-EER_{Multilpe} -ID length Area 1, 2, 3 and 4 10⁵ <mark>ہ</mark>5 0.5 0.5 length (# of bits) ID length (# of bits) 10⁴ 0.4 0.4 Error Rate 0.3 0.2 Error Rate 10³ 0.3 '10² 0.2 10¹ 0.1 0.1 ۱0⁰ 10⁰ 0 0 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.8 1 (a) SRAM 1 (b) SRAM 2 gg10⁵ 10⁵ 0.5 0.5 (# of bits) length (# of bits) 10⁴ 0.4 0.4 10⁴ Error Rate 2.0 Error Bate Error Rate 10³ length (10² 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 10⁰ 100 0 0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 gg(c) SRAM 3 (d) SRAM 4

Area 2: Good operation range with respect to robustness and accuracy.

SRAM #	EER	FAR
I	0.01	0.00
2	0.00	0.00
3	0.03	0.00
4	0.00	0.00



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Conclusion

- Recycled ICs detection with no hardware overhead.
- Acceptable overall accuracy (more than 97%).
- Strict detection performance (100% detection of aged SRAMs).

Future work

- Test on more SRAMs.
- Apply shorter aging time.
- Increasing the trials during the enrollment phase.
- Apply reinforced aging.





Questions?



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Backup slides



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