# A Key-centric Processor Architecture for Secure Computing

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
- MIT LL is building a synthesizable Sparc v8 compatible processor core that embeds
  - Stable-key Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)
  - Deeply embedded key management
  - Hardware-enforced mandatory code and data decryption
- Fosters the creation of trusted groups of computing devices
  - Dynamic keying



Provides a foundation for holistic data protection, embedding security and encryption technology deeply inside of the processor architecture



## **Critical Enabling Technology**




PKI-enabled key management locks *keysets* that encrypt code, data and communication to collections of processors



### **Benefits**


- Features
  - Mandatory de/encryption of code and data
  - Encrypted, relocatable libraries locked to specific processors
  - Security features enabled by the key management system
- Enabling
  - Trusted networks of cooperating processors
  - Separately encrypted functions and libraries
  - Progressive security gradations



#### This processor is a vital piece of a distributed and cooperative processing capability with deeply embedded data and code protection




- Simplified Sparc v8
  microprocessor
  - The execution unit performs math on data stored in registers
  - Code and data are pulled from fast memory *caches*
  - Caches fetch code and data from slower, but much larger main memory



The Sparc architecture specifies many register *windows*. Programs switch in and out of windows when they need to perform a new operation




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


#### Run-time decryption and encryption is inserted into the code and data paths



















Instructions are executed normally by fetching from main memory, to cache, and into the execution pipeline






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
The currently executing instruction places data into one register window, which is bound to the NULL context






Writing a special register instructs the process or that the next "call" instruction will shift contexts to ctx 1






# The call shifts the register window, hiding the callers state from the new code






The new window is bound to ctx 1, and therefore shifts the keyset to activate the instruction decryptor










If the encrypted context attempts to access the caller's state (in the other window) by executing a "restore" instruction, the window shifts...





...and forcibly changes the ctx back to 0, and thus turning off decryption of the code, resulting in a garbage code fetch




- Fully synthesizable System-On-Chip
- High-assurance Suite-B key management
- Tightly coupled but differently encrypted code streams
- Encrypted, relocatable libraries locked to specific instances of the processor
- High-speed decryption of code and data
  - For AES-128: Little to no performance hit (XOR in the data path)
  - For AES-256: 2 cycles of latency at the start of a missed instruction stream
  - No penalty for cache hits



- The processor is not side-channel resistant (currently by choice)
  - Differential Power Analysis
  - Cache timing side-channel
- The data-cache scheme involves changing data under an XOR mask
- Code and data streams currently have no integrity protection
  - Code and data can be read in from AES-GCM encrypted flows, but they are AES-CTR mode encrypted when executing



- We show a novel embedded processor that protects data-in-use by making cryptographic operations intrinsic to processor execution
- The processor enables:
  - Progressive security gradations
  - Security level specified by the application writer
  - Full encryption and masking of code and data
  - Different code/data keys within a single code stream
  - Relocatable encrypted libraries



Secure Data-In-Use

This work builds toward a holistic approach to data protection that considers the entire data life-cycle



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