




Hardware-Assisted Cyber Security in Automotive Systems

IEEE Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, May 3, 2016

Brian Murray, Director Safety and Security Excellence, ZF TRW

ZF Friedrichshafen AG



ZF and TRW, The Power of 2



ZF Group


Areas of Activity: Divisions and Business Units	Car Powertrain Technology	Car Chassis Technology	Commercial Vehicle Technology	Industrial Technology	Active & Passive Safety Technology
	Automatic Transmissions Manual/Dual clutch Transmissions Axle Drives Powertrain Modules Electric Drive Technology Die Casting Technology	Chassis Systems Chassis Components Suspension Technology	Truck & Van Driveline Technology Axle & Transmission Systems for Buses & Coaches CV Chassis Modules CV Damper Technology CV Powertrain Modules	Off-Highway Systems Test Systems Special Driveline Technology Marine Propulsion Systems Aviation Technology Wind Power Technology	Braking Systems Steering Systems Commercial Steering Systems Occupant Safety Systems Electronics Body Control Systems Engineered Fasteners & Components Parts & Service
	ZF Services				
	Electronic Systems				

Brands










Megatrend: Safety


- 32,675 automotive-related fatalities in 2014, > 94% without Vehicle Factors (Source: NHTSA)
- NHTSA believes Active Safety, Autonomous Driving, and Connected Vehicles are an essential part of driving fatalities down




Source: SAFESPOT Project

- Increased interconnectivity of today's and future vehicles makes them potential targets for attack
 - Losses can include: Financial, Operational, Privacy, Safety and Reputation

Hacking and recalls erode critical consumer trust in new technologies important to vehicle safety





A Brief History of Automotive “Hacking”



Other Relevant Automotive Cybersecurity News



- NHTSA under pressure from US Congress to regulate automotive cyber security, legislative action so far
 - [Spy Act](#), [House E&C “Re-TREAD” Act Discussion Draft](#)
 - NHTSA has built capability to analyze vulnerabilities
 - Michigan Senate introduced draft vehicle anti-hacking bill May 2, 2016
- The Automotive Industry is taking action on standards
 - SAE published J3061 Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Automotive Systems, ISO-TC22 N3556 NWIP Automotive Security Engineering
- The Automotive industry also launched an Information Sharing and Analysis Center – AutoISAC
 - Both Association of Global Automakers and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
 - Operated and managed by Booz-Allen
- Security research community
 - Still interested in Automotive – Car Hacking Village back at DEF CON for 2016
 - Believe “Openness” is the best strategy, e.g., push for Automotive Exemption to 2015 DMCA update
- EU – Data Protection Directive



Automotive Industry will create Trusted Communities for Cyber Security Support

Automotive Threats: The Four Ps




Physical Safety

- Safety hazards that can be caused by malicious attacks
- The most visible example of this is takeover of critical car functions like braking and steering



Physical Security

- Attacks on the car door locks, immobilizer and other physical security features



REUTERS/Mike Blake

Personal Information Security

- Attacks intended to extract or leak identity, financial or other private information acquired or managed on the vehicle



Pivot

- Attacks on vehicle systems intended as a precursor (pivot point) to exploit other systems



Automotive Vulnerabilities



External Cyber Interfaces


- All intentional wired and wireless interfaces, including maintenance interfaces to ECUs and diagnostic interfaces
- Vulnerabilities, examples:
 - Lack of authentication
 - Lack of input checking



Verizon

Cyber Architecture

- Configuration of embedded system devices, including wired and wireless communication channels, protocols, power infrastructure and ECUs
- Vulnerabilities, examples:
 - Lack of authentication handshake
 - Integration of sensitive components with “open” systems




G Leen, et al.

Cyber-Physical


- Embedded systems that control the physical world, electric power steering, brake systems, engine control, remote keyless entry, ...
- Vulnerabilities, examples:
 - Software bugs
 - Lack of input checking




Automotive Industry Phases



Harmonizing Safety and Security




Harmonizing Safety and Security




Countermeasures : Auto Industry Current State

Application specific countermeasures will always be needed



Countermeasures : Auto Industry Current State



Automotive Hardware Protected Security – Background



EVITA

- European research project June 2008 –Dec 2011
- **E**-safety **V**ehicle **I**ntrusion **p**ro**T**ected **A**pplications
- <http://evita-project.org/index.html>
- Design, verify, and prototype an architecture for automotive on-board networks where security-relevant components are protected against tampering and sensitive data are protected against compromise when transferred inside a vehicle
- Key architecture component: Hardware Security Module (HSM) integrated on-chip with micro
 - Full, Medium, and Light versions
 - Full: Symmetric, and Asymmetric Cryptography, Hash, Pseudo-Random Numbers (TRNG seed), Secure Keys Storage, Secure Execution Engine, ...
 - Assume attacker will not access inside the chip – protection against side channel attacks and hardware attacks discounted to reduce cost

HIS SHE

- HIS – Hersteller Initiative Software
- SHE – Secure Hardware Extension
- Among other activities, define functional architecture for an HSM that satisfies EVITA Light HSM
- Features: Secure Keys and Execution Engine, AES 128, CMAC, Miyaguchi-Preneel Compression, ...
- Particular attention to Secure Boot


Automotive HSM Status



- Since EVITA, the Automotive Industry has seriously considered Hardware Protected Security and HSMs
 - Primary assumption is that low-cost controllers cannot employ strong security features without hardware support
 - SAE is developing a common set of expectations and requirements – J3101
- Almost all vehicle manufacturers have a strategy that includes Hardware Protected Security
- Almost all semiconductor manufacturers are implementing on-chip, peripheral HSMs or have plans for HSMs
- Most current HSMs conform to SHE or “SHE+” (any features beyond SHE – EVITA “Light” and “Medium”)
 - SHE is a “functional” standard – there is no standardized programming model – nor is there one under development
 - Programming model may be provided by AutoSAR
- Most vehicle manufacturers require features that go beyond SHE, especially asymmetric encryption for certificates, e.g., for software updates
- Most designs are very new
- Drivers and other software supporting HSMs are new


Vendor	Model	Option
NXP	Cobra55	CSE2
NXP	S32	CSEc
NXP	Calypso	HSM
NXP	IMX6	TEE
Renesas	RH850	ICUs
Renesas	RH850	ICUm
ST	Chorus	HSM
TI	Jacinto	TEE
Infineon	Aurix	HSM
Infineon		TPM
Atmel	Border Security Dev	Secure TRx
NXP	S2T	Secure TRx
Oberthur		Euicc

TPM versus HSM – Observations



Trusted Platform Module

- Intended as hardware “Root of Trust”
 - Authentication
 - Attestation
- Typically implemented as standalone chip with significant side-channel protection
- International standard managed by Trusted Computing Group



Secure Hardware Extension

- Intended as hardware-supported set of important security functions
 - **Key features:** secure key storage, secure execution of crypto algorithms, hardware implementation of crypto algorithms and RNG as needed
 - **Anticipated use cases:** secure keystore, authenticated boot, authenticated SW flash, authenticated in-vehicle messaging, broadcast/multi-cast authentication, secure storage, controlled access to private data, secure diagnosis in ECU, vehicle threat protection, IP protection, remote attestation, secure logging, secure erase, anonymization
- Implemented on-chip in microcontroller – threat model assumes hardware attack low-risk
- Function standard under development by SAE

Automotive-inspired HSMs have tremendous potential for IoT security

Some Open Issues



- Simultaneously meeting safety and security requirements with HSMs
 - How do faults affect HSMs?
 - What is error detection capability of HSMs?
- Are there substantial risks from side-channel or other hardware vulnerabilities in current HSMs?
- How will vulnerabilities found in HSMs after deployed be handled?
- Key management strategies for systems employing HSMs
- Performance requirements
 - Rate, timing, power, ...

