


## Hardware-Assisted Cyber Security in Automotive Systems

IEEE Hardware Oriented Security and Trust, May 3, 2016

Brian Murray, Director Safety and Security Excellence, ZF TRW



## ZF and TRW, The Power of $^{\rm 2}$



ZF Group								
Areas of Activity: Divisions and Business Units	Car Powertrain Technology	Car Chassis Technology	Commercial Vehicle Technology	Industrial Technology	Active & Passive Safety Technology			
	Automatic Transmissions Manual/Dual clutch Transmissions Axle Drives Powertrain Modules Electric Drive Technology Die Casting Technology	Chassis Systems Chassis Components Suspension Technology	Truck & Van Driveline Technology Axle & Transmission Systems for Buses & Coaches CV Chassis Modules CV Damper Technology CV Powertrain Modules	Off-Highway Systems Test Systems Special Driveline Technology Marine Propulsion Systems Aviation Technology Wind Power Technology	Braking Systems Steering Systems Commercial Steering Systems Occupant Safety Systems Electronics Body Control Systems Engineered Fasteners &			
		Components						
		Electronic Systems			Parts & Service			



### **ZF TRW**



#### DRIVER ASSIST SYSTEMS

Adaptive Cruise Control Lane Assist Systems Automatic Emergency Braking Emergency Steering Assist

#### SEMI-AUTOMATED DRIVING Traffic Jam Assist Highway Driving Assist

#### STEERING WHEEL SYSTEMS

Touch Sensor in Steering Wheel Rim Hands Off Detection Vibrating Steering Wheel Illumination Technology Contactless Horn System Path-free use of Horn Steering Wheel with Integrated Microphone Electrical Connections Heated Steering Wheel

#### **BRAKING SYSTEMS**

Anti-Lock Braking (ABS) Traction Control Electronic Stability Control (ESC) Slip Control Boost Integrated Brake Control Electric Park Brake Calipers / Rotors Actuation

STEERING SYSTEMS Electrically Powered Hydraulic Steering Electrically Powered Steering Column Drive Electrically Powered Steering Rack Drive

© ZF Friedrichshafen AG, 2015

#### **BODY CONTROL SYSTEMS**

Integrated Electronic Control Panels (IECP) Steering Column Control Modules (SCCM) Switches and Switch Modules HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning) Sensors Access Systems

AIRBAGS

Driver & Passenger Airbags

Curtain and Rollover Airbags Inflator Technology

Self & Passive Venting

Knee and Side Airbags

Low Risk Deployment

#### SEAT BELT SYSTEMS

Active Control Retractor Seat Belt Retractors Load Limiters Pretensioners Active Buckle Lifter Buckles

#### ELECTRONICS

Electronic Control Units Airbag Control Units Video and Radar Sensors Integrated Sensors Safety Domain ECU Pedestrian Protection Crash Sensors Tire Pressure Monitoring

## Megatrend: Safety

- 32,675 automotive-related fatalities in 2014, > 94% without Vehicle Factors (Source: NHTSA)
- NHTSA believes Active Safety, Autonomous Driving, and Connected Vehicles are an essential part of driving fatalities down



777 3rd Party Connected Connected Services Services Motote Brought-in Connectivity Various, focus area for future R ((SiriusXM)) GNSS Antenn Beamed-in Connectivity Industry standards development ΠI 20 Built-in Connectivity


Source: SAFESPOT Project

- Increased interconnectivity of today's and future vehicles makes them potential targets for attack
  - Losses can include: Financial, Operational, Privacy, Safety and Reputation
- Hacking and recalls erode critical consumer trust in new technologies important to vehicle safety



### A Brief History of Automotive "Hacking"

#### 2003



### Only one known potential malicious attack in Automotive to date

## Other Relevant Automotive Cybersecurity News

- NHTSA under pressure from US Congress to regulate automotive cyber security, legislative action so far
  - Spy Act, House E&C "Re-TREAD" Act Discussion Draft
  - NHTSA has built capability to analyze vulnerabilities
  - Michigan Senate introduced draft vehicle anti-hacking bill May 2, 2016
- The Automotive Industry is taking action on standards
  - SAE published J3061 Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Automotive Systems, ISO-TC22 N3556 NWIP Automotive Security Engineering
- The Automotive industry also launched an Information Sharing and Analysis Center AutoISAC
  - Both Association of Global Automakers and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
  - Operated and managed by Booze-Allen
- Security research community
  - Still interested in Automotive Car Hacking Village back at DEF CON for 2016
  - Believe "Openness" is the best strategy, e.g., push for Automotive Exemption to 2015 DMCA update
- EU Data Protection Directive

Automotive Industry will create Trusted Communities for Cyber Security Support

FRED UPTON, MICHIGAN	FRANK PALLONE, JR., NEW JERSEY				
CHAIRMAN	RANKING MEMBER				
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	vehicle systems. More recently, NHTSA expanded its research and testing capabilities in vehicle				

## Automotive Threats: The Four Ps



### **Physical Safety**

- Safety hazards that can be caused by malicious attacks
- The most visible example of this is takeover of critical car functions like braking and steering



#### **Personal Information Security**

• Attacks intended to extract or leak identity, financial or other private information acquired or managed on the vehicle

### **Physical Security**

• Attacks on the car door locks. immobilizer and other physical security features



**REUTERS/Mike Blake** 

### **Pivot**

• Attacks on vehicle systems intended as a precursor (pivot point) to exploit other systems



### Automotive Vulnerabilities

#### **External Cyber Interfaces**


- All intentional wired and wireless interfaces, including maintenance interfaces to ECUs and diagnostic interfaces
- Vulnerabilities, examples:
  - Lack of authentication
  - Lack of input checking



Verizon

### **Cyber Architecture**

- Configuration of embedded system devices, including wired and wireless communication channels, protocols, power infrastructure and ECUs
- Vulnerabilities, examples:
  - Lack of authentication handshake
  - Integration of sensitive components with "open" systems






### **Cyber-Physical**


- Embedded systems that control the physical world, electric power steering, brake systems, engine control, remote keyless entry, ...
- Vulnerabilities, examples:
  - Software bugs
  - Lack of input checking





## **Automotive Industry Phases**












## **Countermeasures : Auto Industry Current State**



## Automotive Hardware Protected Security - Background



### EVITA

- European research project June 2008 Dec 2011
- E-safety Vehicle Intrusion proTected Applications
- http://evita-project.org/index.html
- Design, verify, and prototype an architecture for automotive on-board networks where securityrelevant components are protected against tampering and sensitive data are protected against compromise when transferred inside a vehicle
- Key architecture component: Hardware Security Module (HSM) integrated on-chip with micro
  - Full, Medium, and Light versions
  - Full: Symmetric, and Asymmetric Cryptography, Hash, Pseudo-Random Numbers (TRNG seed), Secure Keys Storage, Secure Execution Engine,
    ...
  - Assume attacker will not access inside the chip protection against side channel attacks and hardware attacks discounted to reduce cost

HIS SHE

- HIS Herstellar Initiative Software
- SHE Secure Hardware Extension
- Among other activities, define functional architecture for an HSM that satisfies EVITA Light HSM
- Features: Secure Keys and Execution Engine, AES 128, CMAC, Miyaguchi-Preneel Compression, ...
- Particular attention to Secure Boot


## Automotive HSM Status

- Since EVITA, the Automotive Industry has seriously considered Hardware Protected Security and HSMs
  - Primary assumption is that low-cost controllers cannot employ strong security features without hardware support
  - SAE is developing a common set of expectations and requirements J3101
- Almost all vehicle manufacturers have a strategy that includes Hardware Protected Security
- Almost all semiconductor manufacturers are implementing onchip, peripheral HSMs or have plans for HSMs
- Most current HSMs conform to SHE or "SHE+" (any features beyond SHE – EVITA "Light" and "Medium")
  - SHE is a "functional" standard there is no standardized programming model nor is there one under development
  - Programming model may be provided by AutoSAR
- Most vehicle manufacturers require features that go beyond SHE, especially asymmetric encryption for certificates, e.g., for software updates
- Most designs are very new
- Drivers and other software supporting HSMs are new




Vendor	Model	Option
NXP	Cobra55	CSE2
NXP	S32	CSEc
NXP	Calypso	HSM
NXP	IMX6	TEE
Renesas	RH850	ICUs
Renesas	RH850	ICUm
ST	Chorus	HSM
ті	Jacinto	TEE
Infineon	Aurix	HSM
Infineon		ТРМ
Atmel	Border Security Dev	Secure TRx
NXP	S2T	Secure TRx
Oberthur		Euicc

### **TPM versus HSM – Observations**



### **Trusted Platform Module**

- Intended as hardware "Root of Trust"
  - Authentication
  - Attestation
- Typically implemented as standalone chip with significant side-channel protection
- International standard managed by Trusted Computing Group



Secure Hardware Extension

- Intended as hardware-supported set of important security functions
  - Key features: secure key storage, secure execution of crypto algorithms, hardware implementation of crypto algorithms and RNG as needed
  - Anticipated use cases: secure keystore, authenticated boot, authenticated SW flash, authenticated in-vehicle messaging, broadcast/multi-cast authentication, secure storage, controlled access to private data, secure diagnosis in ECU, vehicle threat protection, IP protection, remote attestation, secure logging, secure erase, anonymization
- Implemented on-chip in microcontroller threat model assumes hardware attack low-risk
- Function standard under development by SAE

#### Automotive-inspired HSMs have tremendous potential for IoT security

# 

### Some Open Issues

- Simultaneously meeting safety and security requirements with HSMs
  - How do faults affect HSMs?
  - What is error detection capability of HSMs?
- Are there substantial risks from side-channel or other hardware vulnerabilities in current HSMs?
- How will vulnerabilities found in HSMs after deployed be handled?
- Key management strategies for systems employing HSMs
- Performance requirements
  - Rate, timing, power, ...

