# Large Laser Spots and Fault Sensitivity Analysis

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Schellenberg et al.: Large Laser Spots and Fault Sensitivity Analysis May 4, 2016, IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), McLean, VA, USA

# **Fault Injection**

Idea: Faulty computation might leak secret key!

### **Trivial Fault Attack**

### Assume asymmetric key memory with respect to faults:

- $\Box$  0  $\rightarrow$  1: possible using fault injection
- $\Box$  1  $\rightarrow$  0: impossible
- Attack:
  - Send identical input repeatedly
  - Inject fault into key memory, bit-wise!
  - Ciphertext?
    - $\Box \text{ Changed } \rightarrow \text{key bit was } 0$
    - $\Box$  Unchanged  $\rightarrow$  key bit was already 1

# **Fault Injection**

### **Physical Methods**

- Clock glitches
- Voltage glitches
- EM pulses
- Light (flash lamps, lasers)



### **Laser Fault Injection**

- Precise spatial control ("up to single transistors")
- Precise timing
- SRAM: Trivial fault attack possible!

# Motivation

### **Future?**

- Spot size is physically bounded!
- Diffraction limit (Rayleigh-Criterion):  $\frac{1.22 \lambda}{2 \text{ NA}}$
- Example:
  - □ Typical numerical aperture (NA): 0.7
  - $\Box \lambda = 975 nm$
  - $\square \rightarrow 850$  nm effective spot

### **Physical limit for laser fault injection reached?**

- SRAM: limit at 45nm? → maybe\*
- Latest technology inherently secure? No!

\*Selmke et al.: "Precise Laser Fault injections into 90nm and 45nm SRAM-cells", CARDIS'15



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# Large Laser Spots and Fault Sensitivity Analysis\*

\**Moradi et al.*: "On the Power of Fault Sensitivity Analysis and Collision Side-Channel Attacks in a Combined Setting", CHES'11

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### **Combinatorial Circuits**



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- Critical delay depends on input
- → *Identical* input means *identical* critical delay

# **"Collision Correlation"-Enhanced Fault Sensitivity Analysis**

#### How to exploit?

Example: glitch position fixed at 50% faulty outputs, 1000 random plaintexts



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# **"Collision Correlation"-Enhanced Fault Sensitivity Analysis**

#### How to exploit?

Example: glitch position fixed at 50% faulty outputs, send 1000 inputs



### → Test all possible $\Delta \in \{0, 1, 2, ..., 255\}$

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# **Timing Violations using Lasers**

#### Laser Fault Injection in a nutshell:

- Set a signal to a false value
- For the **duration** of the pulse

# **Timing Violations:**





# Identical input dependency as before!

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## **Large Laser Spots?**



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# Setup

#### Device Under Test: Atmel ATXMega16A4U

- 250nm feature size
- Hardware AES
  - 375 clock cycles (serialized SubBytes)
  - Target: Combinatorial Sbox circuit

#### **Optical Setup**

- Mitutoyo NIR  $10x \rightarrow 4.5 \ \mu m$  spot size @ 975nm
- 80  $\mu$ m out-of-focus  $\rightarrow$  45  $\mu$ m spot size

45µm

1µm 🛑

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## ATXmega16A4U AES



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backside NIR

# **Characterization: Input vs Pulse Length**

Four different fixed inputs, increasing laser pulse width (steps of 5ps) Colors: different faulty output values



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# Results



#### **Correlation for each delta hypothesis**

- Varying fault probability: {20%, 50%, 80%}
- N Number of Measurements
- Example 20%, N=1000  $\rightarrow$  200 out of 1000 shots faulty

#### → Correct hypothesis shows highest correlation

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## Outlook

# ATXmega (250nm min. feature size)

- Sbox: ~ 230 μm x 310 μm
- 45 μm spot

### Scaling to 11nm?

- Sbox: ~ 10 μm x 13μm
- $\sim 2 \ \mu m \ spot > diffraction limit$

Trade-Off: Spatial accuracy vs timing resolution
ps / fs lasers with very low jitter available



# Conclusion

- Considered timing violations using lasers
- Laser + FSA: very relaxed fault model
  - □ No ciphertext/faultytext
  - □ Only information whether fault occurred or not
  - □ Random (known) plaintext
  - □ Large spot size OK
  - □ Should work down to latest technology
- Countermeasures at smallest feature sizes still required

### **Future Work:**

Replacing very high speed clock glitches by laser fault injection?

# Thanks! Questions?